My Ultimate Sign-in System Made Me Invincible

Chapter 608: The Situation They All Found Themselves (2)

TṢMC wasn’t just the most consequential company in the portfolio. It was the most consequential company on Earth from a geopolitical standpoint, and a 3% stake in it carried implications that made every other position in the Bellemere portfolio look straightforward.

***

TṢMC. Hsinchu, Taiwan.

The call that woke the chairman came from the company’s Washington liaison at 12:40 AM Taiwan time, which was 11:40 AM in Washington, which meant the US government had spent the first hour after the Bloomberg article dropped before deciding TṢMC needed to know immediately.

That gap — one hour — told him everything about how seriously Washington was taking it.

He read the article in full before speaking.

"How many calls have come in," he said.

"Four from Washington so far. The Commerce Department. The National Security Council. Two from Senate offices — Commerce Committee and Armed Services." A pause. "Beijing made contact forty minutes ago through our mainland liaison office. Informal. They wanted to know if we had received the article."

The chairman set the phone down on his desk and looked at it.

TṢMC manufactured the most advanced semiconductor chips on Earth. Not designed them — manufactured them. Every chip that powered the most capable AI systems, every processor in every advanced weapons system, every component in every device that separated a tier-one military capability from every other kind — the physical object, the actual silicon, was made here. In Taiwan.

The company had spent decades navigating the specific geopolitical reality that its existence created. It was the most strategically significant manufacturing operation in the world, located on an island that two governments claimed and one of them was prepared to take by force. The implicit guarantee that had held that situation in place was the impossibility of what happened to TṢMC if it were taken — the disruption to every advanced economy on Earth simultaneously.

TṢMC was not just a company. It was a structural fact of the world order.

And an eighteen-year-old with $735 billion and no documented wealth origin held 3% of it.

"What Beijing actually wants to know," the chairman said, "is whether this person is American."

"Yes," the liaison said. "That is what they want to know."

The implications ran in every direction simultaneously and all of them were serious.

If Liam Scott was American — or connected to American interests, which the Nova Technologies speculation made plausible — then a 3% position in TṢMC potentially represented American strategic influence over the company that neither the US government had sought through official channels nor Taiwan had been consulted on.

Washington would want to claim it. Beijing would want to contest it. Taipei would want to understand whether the position had been coordinated with the American government or represented something neither government controlled.

If the Nova Technologies connection was real — and no government had confirmed it, but every government with an intelligence apparatus was running the same calculation the Bloomberg article had made visible — then the picture was different and worse.

It would be the picture of a private entity operating from a lunar base, outside every jurisdiction, with technology no government could account for, held 3% of the company that manufactured the chips underpinning every advanced military and AI capability on Earth.

No government had a framework for that.

"The Commerce Department," the chairman said. "What specifically did they want."

"Information on how the position was established. Whether there had been any contact between the Bellemere Family Office and TṢMC management. Whether Nova Technologies had approached us for any purpose — chip supply, manufacturing partnership, technology consultation." The liaison paused. "They also asked whether we had any information about Nova Technologies’ fabrication capability."

The chairman was quiet for a moment.

"What did you tell them."

"That we would respond through appropriate channels."

"Good." He looked at the article again. At the 3% figure. At the line about the origin of the capital not being present in any public record. "The fabrication question is what this is really about. Not the financial position."

The liaison said nothing because it was true and they both knew it.

Nova Technologies had built a lunar base, a space station, a fleet of spacecraft, and a device that no engineering team on Earth could reverse engineer.

The fabrication capability behind what Nova Technologies had produced in seven months was not explainable by any known supply chain or manufacturing process.

TṢMC was the most advanced chip fabricator in the world. And the question every government was now asking — not publicly, not in any document that would be acknowledged — was whether Nova Technologies needed TṢMC at all.

It was whether the 3% position was strategic or incidental. Whether a company that could build what Nova Technologies had built from a lunar base had any dependency on the terrestrial semiconductor supply chain, or whether the position existed for a different reason entirely.

Both answers were alarming.

If Nova Technologies needed TṢMC, then a private entity outside every jurisdiction held a stake in its own critical supplier, creating a relationship with no regulatory framework and no government oversight.

If Nova Technologies didn’t need TṢMC — if the position was financial, or strategic in some other way — then an entity with demonstrated fabrication capability exceeding anything on Earth held 3% of the company the world depended on, and the nature of that interest was completely unknown.

"Washington is going to push for disclosure," the chairman said. "Full shareholder communication records. Documentation of how the position was established. Everything we have."

"Yes."

"And Beijing is going to push for the same thing through different channels."

"Yes."

"And Taipei is going to ask us why we weren’t aware of a 3% position and what our oversight failure was."

"That conversation has already been scheduled for this morning."

TṢMC navigated its geopolitical position by being indispensable to everyone simultaneously. The US needed it. China needed it. Every advanced economy needed it. The balance had held because the company’s value was equal to every party that might otherwise move against it.

That balance assumed the major variables were known.

An eighteen-year-old with $735 billion and a possible connection to a company operating from the moon, holding 3% of the most strategically significant manufacturer on Earth, was not a known variable.

It was not a variable any of the governments that had maintained the balance had accounted for. And the calls coming in from every direction — Washington, Beijing, and now he could see the Taipei government liaison’s number appearing on his other line — were the sound of that balance being tested by something none of its architects had designed it to handle.

He picked up the Taipei line.

"I know," he said, before the voice on the other end could speak. "I’m already on it."