Chapter 287 - 70: BND and the East German Spy (2)

Chapter 287: Chapter 70: BND and the East German Spy (2)

After consulting with his superiors, Schmidt decided on a "soft approach"—no public arrest, but a private warning to make Stein back down.

The reason was simple: Stein had too many connections in West German politics and media circles. A public arrest would cause a huge public outcry. Besides, Stein was just a peripheral informant, not a core spy. There was no need to escalate the situation.

************

One afternoon in late June, Stein received a phone call at home.

"Mr. Stein, this is Schmidt from the Federal Intelligence Agency. We need to talk to you."

Stein’s heart tightened. "Talk about what?"

"You’ll find out," Schmidt’s voice was calm. "Come to our office in Bonn tomorrow at three in the afternoon. If you don’t, we’ll come to you."

The call ended.

Stein sat on the sofa, his palms drenched in sweat.

He knew he had been exposed.

*************

The next afternoon, Stein showed up at the BND’s Bonn office on time.

Schmidt and another official were waiting for him in a conference room.

"Have a seat, Mr. Stein," Schmidt said, gesturing to the chair opposite him.

Stein sat down, forcing himself to appear calm. "What do you want with me?"

Schmidt pushed a stack of photos across the table toward him. "These are pictures of you meeting with Gerhard at the Golden Lion Bar last Wednesday night."

Stein looked at the photos, and his face instantly turned pale.

"Gerhard is an East German intelligence officer, as you should know," Schmidt continued. "We’ve also investigated your bank accounts and found that you’ve been receiving money from the International Cultural Exchange Foundation for a long time. Mr. Stein, how long have you been working for East Germany?"

Stein was silent for a long time before finally saying in a low voice, "I... I only provided some information related to cultural exchange. It wasn’t espionage."

"It doesn’t matter what you call it," Schmidt said. "The point is, you have two choices now. First, we arrest you for espionage. You’ll be sentenced, and your career will be over. Second, you walk away, sever all contact with East German intelligence, and we’ll let it go."

Stein looked up at Schmidt. "And if I choose the second option?"

"Then you’d best leave Bonn as soon as possible. Change cities, change careers," Schmidt said. "We’ll continue to monitor you. If we find you’re still in contact with East Germany, we won’t be so polite next time."

Stein closed his eyes and took a deep breath.

"I understand."

A week later, Stein resigned from all his positions and quietly moved out of Bonn.

The "Autumn Leaf" tendril in Bonn was severed.

*************

When Werner received Anna’s message, he was in a meeting in one of Koko’s conference rooms.

His secretary knocked and entered, handing him a note. "Mr. Werner, someone delivered a document for you."

Werner opened the note. It contained only four words: The goods are in.

It was Anna’s code phrase.

Werner crossed the second name off in his notebook.

’Two-thirds.’

After the meeting, he returned to his office and lit a cigarette.

’Just one left.’

Kurt Weis, an economics professor at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich.

He was the most difficult of the three to deal with.

**********

Werner spent a full week researching Weis.

According to the file Anna provided, Weis was an extremely cautious man.

He never made direct contact with East German intelligence officers. All communication went through intermediaries.

His cover was also excellent—he was genuinely conducting academic research and participating in academic exchanges between East and West Germany.

It was difficult to find any flaws in his cover.

Werner initially considered using a method similar to the one he’d used on Hausen—setting a business trap. But Weis wasn’t involved in business, so that tactic wouldn’t work.

He also considered having Anna arrange a "coincidence" for the BND to discover Weis, but Weis was too careful. It would be difficult for Anna to get evidence of him meeting with East German intelligence personnel.

’I have to try a different approach.’

Werner thought of a plan: use Weis’s own professional expertise to set a trap.

Weis was an expert on the economies of East and West Germany. He frequently attended academic conferences and business forums to present his analysis of the East German economy.

If he could get Weis to inadvertently reveal some internal East German data in a public setting—data he shouldn’t know—it would attract the attention of West German intelligence.

’But how to do it?’

Werner decided to use Reynard’s connections to orchestrate a setup.

***************

Reynard had business partners in both West Berlin and Munich. Werner had him organize a "Seminar on East-West German Economic Cooperation," inviting a number of West German entrepreneurs and scholars to discuss the future of the Ned trade.

"Can you get Professor Kurt Weis to attend?" Werner asked.

"Weis?" Reynard thought for a moment. "I should be able to. He often attends these kinds of events. You want him there?"

"Yes. He’s an expert in the field. His presence would give the seminar more weight."

"Alright, I’ll arrange it."

Two weeks later, the seminar was held at a hotel in Munich. About thirty people attended, including entrepreneurs, scholars, and a few journalists.

Kurt Weis was also there. He wore a gray suit and gold-rimmed glasses, looking like a typical academic.

The seminar’s theme was "Opportunities and Challenges in the Ned Trade." Several speakers took the stage one after another to discuss the current state and future prospects of trade between East and West Germany.

Weis also spoke. His speech was highly academic, citing a large amount of data and theory, and it sounded very professional.

Then it was the turn of a business owner named Herman to speak.

Herman was an old friend of Reynard’s who ran a machinery import-export company.

During his speech, he "casually" mentioned some data:

"According to my sources, the total value of East Germany’s Ned trade last year was about two billion West German Marks, roughly fifteen percent higher than the officially published figures. This discrepancy mainly comes from certain unrecorded gray-market transactions..."

Everyone present looked surprised.

The officially published figure was 1.7 billion, while Herman was claiming 2 billion—a difference of 300 million. This was no small sum.

"Mr. Herman, where did you get this data?" a journalist asked.

Herman smiled. "I’ve been in this business for twenty years. I have my sources. Of course, this is just my personal estimate; it’s not necessarily accurate."

Then he turned to Weis. "Professor Weis, what are your thoughts? As an expert, do you find this figure credible?"

All eyes turned to Weis.

Weis froze for a moment.

His mind raced. Weis actually knew the two-billion figure Herman mentioned—it was internal data he had obtained through East German intelligence channels.

But he wasn’t supposed to know it.

As a West German academic, it was impossible for him to have access to East Germany’s internal statistics. If he admitted to knowing this figure, it would be tantamount to exposing his intelligence source.

He decided to give an ambiguous answer.

Weis was silent for a few seconds, then said, "Well... Mr. Herman’s estimate has some merit. Based on my research, East Germany’s actual trade volume could indeed be higher than the official figures. A fifteen percent discrepancy sounds plausible."

He tried to be vague, but the calm tone, suggesting he’d known all along, was still noticed by some people in the room.

Herman pressed on, "In that case, Professor, what areas do you think this discrepancy mainly comes from?"

Weis was once again caught in a dilemma.

He did, in fact, know the answer—the discrepancy was mainly due to the smuggling of military-industrial materials and embargoed goods. But this was highly sensitive information; he couldn’t say it.

"Well... it’s hard to say," Weis said, pushing up his glasses. "It could involve multiple sectors."

His answer sounded cautious, but some of the more perceptive people present had already sensed that something was off.

An academic who was truly in the dark would have been more curious, would have pressed for the data’s source, would have raised objections.

But Weis’s reaction was more like that of someone who already knew the truth and was deliberately trying to keep a low profile.

Among the seminar attendees was a business owner named Wolfgang, who was a peripheral informant for the BND. He often provided the BND with business intelligence.

Three days after the seminar ended, Wolfgang called his BND contact.

"A few days ago, I attended a seminar on the Ned trade and noticed something strange," Wolfgang said. "There was a professor named Kurt Weis who seemed to be unusually familiar with East Germany’s internal data."

"Weis?" The BND contact jotted down the name. "Tell me more."

Wolfgang recounted what had happened at the seminar in detail.

"...When Herman mentioned the two-billion figure, everyone in the room was surprised, but Weis wasn’t surprised at all. His reaction was as if he’d known the data all along."

"Interesting," the contact said. "I’ll report this up the chain."